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CASE NOTES
A lack of precedent, or mere novelty in incident, is no obstacle to the
award of equitable relief, if the case presented is referable to an estab-
lished head of equity jurisprudence-either of primary right or of remedy
merely . . . the court has the broadest equitable power to grant the
appropriate relief." 25
Thus the Nutley case, although not without foundation in New Jersey
case law, is still a unique approach to labor relations law at the state level,
and poses many interesting questions. If a court of Equity can rely upon
a constitutional provision guaranteeing the rights of organization and
collective bargaining, and its inherent equitable powers to provide an
adequate remedy for any wrong, can it also order an election and certify
a particular union as the authorized bargaining agent? Congress had to
pass the National Labor Relations Act and establish the NLRB before the
complex problems presented by certification elections could be met. If
failure to certify a union can be deemed a wrong, then according to the
reasoning of the Court in the Nutley case, the Equity court can provide
an adequate remedy, such as a certification election. The Highstown case
gives a good indication of how far the New Jersey Court can go in
exercising the functions of a labor relations board. There the Court
enjoined one union from picketing a plant after another union had been
accepted as the bargaining agent by the employer on the basis of a
privately held employee election. It would be a short step for the Court
to order an election and certify the union itself.
Many states have constitutional provisions similar to the one relied upon
by the New Jersey Court. It will be interesting to note the extent to
which the New Jersey view will be adopted regarding those provisions.
25 Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 190, 175 A.2d 643,644 (1961).
TORTS-AFFIRMATIVE DUTY-THE EMERGENCY
ROOM IN A PRIVATE HOSPITAL
In attempting to obtain additional medical assistance because their doc-
tor's treatment had been ineffective to ease their four month old son's
high fever, insomnia, and diarrhea, Mr. and Mrs. Darius M. Manlove took
their baby to the emergency room of Wilmington General Hospital and
related his condition to the nurse on duty. The nurse explained to the
parents that the hospital could not give treatment because the child was
already under the care of a doctor, and there was a danger the medica-
tions would conflict. The nurse did not examine the baby but did make
an unsuccessful attempt to reach the attending doctor. The Manloves
returned home with the child who died about three hours later. The
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parents sued the hospital to recover damages under the Wrongful Death
Act. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which was denied by
the trial court. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court, in affirming the
denial of summary judgment and remanding the case, held that liability
will accrue to a private hospital' which fails to grant admission and as-
sistance in an unmistakable emergency, and that a question of fact was
presented as to whether the nurse on duty was derelict in her duty in
not recognizing an emergency from the symptoms related to her. Wil-
mington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 51 Del. -- , 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
In cases involving negligence the statement is frequently made by the
courts that a defendant will not be liable to a plaintiff unless he has
breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. That duty may be imposed by
either the common law itself,2 as in the noted case, by statute,3 or by
contract. 4 While this rule may seem clear enough, like all statements of
abstract principles, real difficulties arise in its application to the myriad
fact situations of life in 1962, especially where a court is asked to impose
an affirmative duty on a defendant who is acting gratuitously. The courts
were naturally slow to impose affirmative duties to act in such circum-
I An Illinois Appellate Court [Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930)] classi-
fied hospitals for purposes of liability as public, charitable, and private. A public
hospital is owned by the government and devoted to public uses, and such hospital is
not liable for injuries to a patient caused by the negligence or misconduct of its em-
ployees or agents. The court defines a charitable hospital as one organized, not for
the purpose of making a profit, but for charitable purposes; it is not liable for the
torts or omissions of its professional staff unless it fails to exercise due care in their
selection. A private hospital is one founded and maintained by a private person or
corporation, and the court states that the liability of such a hospital for damages grow-
ing out of negligence is the same as that of natural persons.
In a suit therefore, the liability of a hospital may depend on its status as either a
public, charitable or private hospital. Status, however, is not solely determined by the
hospital's corporate character, nor by the fact that it receives paying as well as charity
patients, but is determined by whether it serves a public or private charity and by its
type of management. Thus, a hospital may be created under a private corporate
charter, and yet for purposes of liability, it may be classified by the courts as a charita-
ble hospital if its purpose is to serve a private charity.
For detailed discussion of the above principles see the following cases: Wilmington
Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 51 Del. -- , 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Olander v. Johnson, 258
Ill. App. 89 (1930); Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089
(1911), rev'd on other grounds in Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N.E.2d 410 (1956); University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219
(1907); Downes v. Harper Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894), rev'd on other
grounds in Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Hennepin
County v. Brotherhood of Church of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460. 8 N.W. 595 (1881);
McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
2 Massey v. Worth, 39 Del. 211, 197 Atl. 673 (Super. Ct. 1938).
3 Lynch v. Lynch, 39 Del. 1, 195 At. 799 (Super. Ct. 1937).
4 Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ex. 1837); Langridge
v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (C.P. 1837).
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stances. In the consideration of the noted case, it is profitable to examine
some of the early situations, other than those involving hospitals, where
the courts, for varying reasons and with varying rationales, found that a
defendant had an affirmative duty to act even though the defendant was
performing a gratuitous service. In an examination of the early railroad
crossing cases, the landlord and tenant cases, the employer-employee cases
and others, the genesis of a sophisticated doctrine in the law of torts
which closely resembles promissory estoppel in equity can be recognized.
Before examining the instant case further, it will be helpful to examine
the reasoning of these other courts which treated different, but essentially
analogous, situations, because that examination will give us a useful in-
sight into the present problem.
It was long recognized, in the case of railroads, that if a member of the
public who knew of a railroad's practice of keeping a flagman at a cross-
ing was injured because the railroad withdrew its flagman, the railroad
was liable to the person injured because it had breached a duty.5 Thus,
as early as 1886, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the defendant
railroad was liable to a person who was injured because the defendant
withdrew its crossing flagman and the plaintiff, knowing the flagman was
normally there, started across the tracks and was struck by a train." In
the well known case of Erie R.R. v. Stewart,7 the principle is succinctly
stated that:
[W]here the practice is known to the traveler upon the highway, and such
traveler has been educated into reliance upon it, some positive duty must rest
upon the railway .... The elements of invitation and assurance of safety exist
in this connection . . . [the railroad] should not be permitted thereafter to
say that no duty required, arose from or attached to these precautions.8
In summary, what this group of cases holds is that if the railroad com-
pany promises the public, expressly or impliedly, that it will provide cross-
ing watchmen, and then acts on the promise by providing watchmen, and
a member of the public is injured while acting in reliance on that promise,
liability on the railroad results when the promise is not fulfilled.
Five years later the case of Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros.9 arose. Here
5 Erie R. R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930);
Greenfield v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. L., 289 111. App. 147, 6 N.E.2d 888 (1937);
Westaway v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 56 Minn. 28, 57 N.W. 222 (1893); Burns v.
North Chicago Rolling Mill Co., 65 Wis. 312, 27 N.W. 43 (1886).
6 Burns v. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co., 65 Wis. 312, 27 N.W. 43 (1886).
740 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930).
8 Id. at 857 (Emphasis added.).
9 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd in 247 App. Div. 867, 287 N.Y.S.
136 (1936).
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plaintiff's intestate was taken ill in the defendant's store. Defendant un-
dertook to aid her and left her in its infirmary for six hours without
medical care. Intestate died as a result of such neglect. Plaintiff, as ad-
ministrator of her estate, sued for damages; defendant moved to dismiss
and the court denied the motion, holding that the defendant had as-
sumed a duty toward plaintiff's intestate by meddling in affairs with
which it had no legal concern, and that once the duty arose, its neglect
was actionable. One can see in the decision a close relation to the railroad
cases. Defendant, at the least, impliedly promised to aid his business invitee
by assuming control of her once the injury had occurred. Intestate had a
right to rely on defendant's implied promise, the neglect of which re-
sulted in liability.
Even the area of landlord and tenant furnishes us with examples where
courts have followed the doctrine that if a defendant makes an express
promise to a plaintiff, then acts on the promise, and the plaintiff is in-
jured while relying on that promise, liability will result if the defendant
has been negligent. In Bartlett v. Taylor,10 the defendant lessor was under
no contractual duty to repair the leased premises but gratuitously ordered
his lessee's heavy garage door repaired. Plaintiff, the lessee, was injured
when the door fell on his head, and although the defendant argued that
he had no duty and that his attempted repair was a gratuitous promise,
the Supreme Court of Missouri, in affirming a judgment for plaintiff,
held that the plaintiff had a right to rely on the assurance of safety im-
plied in the repairs.
Employer cases furnish further examples of the principle under exami-
nation. In Union Carbide & Carbon v. Stapelton," the defendant employ-
er required its employees to submit to physical examination and X rays.
It failed to reveal to the plaintiff that he was suffering from pulmonary
tuberculosis which ultimately rendered plaintiff permanently disabled.
Plaintiff sued the employer for damages, grounding his suit on defendant's
negligence in failing to disclose plaintiff's condition. Affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals said:
That the appellant [employer] had no obligation to give Stapelton a physical
examination we can accept without qualification. But, when it undertook to
do so, Stapelton was entitled to and did rely on the expectation that he would
be told of any dangerous condition actually disclosed by the examination. The
appellant was therefore liable for injury to Stapelton caused by its negligent
omission to advise him of his tubercular condition. 12
A similar case in New York presents slightly different problems. 13
There the plaintiff's employer gratuitously offered physical examinations
10 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d 844 (1943).
11237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956). 12 ld. at 232-3.
13 Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc.2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
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and X rays. It was the defendant's practice to inform the employees of
adverse results only. The plaintiff, relying on this practice, developed tu-
berculosis and communicated the disease to his wife. Plaintiff and his wife
sued the employer; defendant moved to dismiss and the court, denying
the motion, held that defendant's negligent omission gave the plaintiff
employee a cause of action. The court said further that since it was fore-
seeable that plaintiff's wife might contract the disease, the employer's
negligent conduct as to his employee also constituted negligence as to the
plaintiff's wife. One wonders where the court would set the outer limits
of liability on the employer here. The principle under examination begins
to crystallize. The defendants made gratuitous promises, either express or
implied; they acted on those promises and the plaintiffs were injured after
they relied on the defendants.
The case of Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland14 represents
an even further extension of the concept of duty under inquiry. The de-
ceased was an employee of Bethlehem Steel Co. which was erecting a
bridge over the defendant's electric wires. The defendant's "trouble" man
had disconnected the high voltage wires, but had warned the workers of
some other, lower voltage wires. Later the "trouble" man reconnected
the high voltage lines without telling the construction company. De-
ceased was trying to position a section of drainage pipe suspended by a
steel cable from the bridge and was electrocuted when the cable touched
the high voltage lines. In suit for wrongful death, defendant appealed
from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict. The Circuit Court of
Appeals held that defendant was guilty of negligence in reconnecting its
high voltage wires without notice because the workers had relied on the
defendant's representations of apparent safety.
Another example is the case of Abrescb v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.15
Plaintiff, on discovering his business building was on fire, dialed "0" and
asked the operator to call the fire department. The operator failed to do
so. Realizing the fire department had not been summoned, plaintiff con-
tacted them himself, but by the time the fire trucks arrived, the building
was consumed by fire. Plaintiff sued for damages alleging negligence; the
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, holding that if defendant had voluntarily in-
duced others to rely on it for help and then failed to act, its failure would
result in tort liability. Here is a plaintiff claiming a defendant had made
an implied promise to summon aid in emergency situations. In the past
the defendant had acted on that promise by furnishing aid; the plaintiff,
relying on the promise, sustained injury when defendant failed to per-
form.
15 246 Minn. 408, 75 N.V.2d 206 (1956).14 120 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1941).
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A more tenuous extension of this "affirmative duty" concept is Schus-
ter v. City of New York.' Plaintiff's intestate gave information to the
police which led to the arrest of Willie Sutton. The deceased received
threats on his life but the police gave him only partial protection. Nine-
teen days after Sutton's arrest, deceased was shot by an unknown assail-
ant. Plaintiff, the father of the deceased, sued alleging negligence. De-
fendant's motion to dismiss was sustained by the trial court, but the Court
of Appeals, reversing, held that in this case there existed a relationship
from which a duty to furnish police protection arose. Even though there
were vigorous dissents, this case illustrates that the majority of the court
found a "duty relationship": a promise by the city to aid those who sup-
plied information on Sutton's whereabouts, action on the promise in sup-
plying partial protection to the deceased, and his reliance on that promise
and damage.
The pliancy of the principle is further evidenced by another New York
case17 in which plaintiff was assaulted in the defendant's subway station
and sued to recover damages. Recognizing the high degree of care which
a carrier must exercise toward its passengers, the New York Appellate
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal holding, that whether a police-
man was present at other stations and whether the defendant transit au-
thority was negligent in performing its duties were questions of fact for
the jury.
In short then, in all these cases there is a defendant who makes an ex-
press or implied promise and then acts on that promise, and a plaintiff
who, relying on the defendant's promise, suffers injury or damage. With
this summary in mind, an examination of the duties a private hospital
must discharge is now relevant. As to whether or not there is a duty on a
private hospital to maintain an emergency room, the Supreme Court of
Missouri said: "While Barnard [Free Skin and Cancer Hospital] is and
has been operating a free clinic there is no duty anywhere placed upon
its directors to do so, and if it should cease doing so, that would not de-
stroy Barnard's legal entity and functional integrity."' Without any such
duty incumbent on the private hospital, the question arises whether there
is any duty to admit every applicant. Of six courts facing this problem,
one has given a clear negative answer, 19 and five courts by way of dicta
10 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
1 Amoruso v. New York City Transit Authority, 12 App. Div.2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d
855 (1960).
lSTaylor v. Baldwin, 362 Mo. 1224, 1243, 247 S.W.2d 741, 751 (1952).
19 Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
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have arrived at a negative conclusion.20 Thus the rule seemed to be that
private hospital authorities themselves would determine who would or
would not receive treatment in the hospital, and no common law duty
compelled them to admit anyone not desired by them, nor were they
bound by a contractual or statutory duty charging them with any duty
to admit or render service.
The first case squarely facing the problem of duty to admit was Bir-
mingbam Baptist Hosp. v. Crews.21 In that case, Mr. Crews brought his
two year old daughter to the defendant hospital. While a doctor was
confirming a tentative diagnosis of diphtheria, the nurse administered
oxygen, and a few minutes later the doctor administered 20,000 units of
antitoxin. A short time thereafter another doctor gave her an additional
20,000 units of antitoxin; the child appeared to respond to this emergency
treatment. The hospital supervisor, however, refused to admit the child,
ostensibly because the rules prohibited admittance to a person suffering
from a contagious disease. Mr. Crews returned home with the child who
died fifteen minutes after his arrival. The parents brought suit under the
Wrongful Death Act, alleging that the hospital's wrongful refusal to ad-
mit constituted negligence. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in denying
liability said:
Defendant is a private corporation, and not a public institution, and owes the
public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it.... The evidence must
show that defendant became due to render the service by having undertaken
to provide it, when there was otherwise no duty to do so, or by having ren-
dered a treatment in an emergency, without undertaking to provide full hospi-
tal service, but that such treatment was known to be likely to and did create
a condition which was extremely dangerous unless further partial (at least)
hospital service was rendered until that hazard which defendant voluntarily
created was passed, and that the death of the child was accelerated by the
failure of the defendant to discharge such duty.22
Here is a private hospital which at least made an implied promise to aid
society by setting up its emergency ward; the plaintiff, relying on that
implied promise, brings his child to the emergency room where the de-
fendant treats and then turns her away. In short, the plaintiff is no longer
the one acted upon; he is the actor by accepting the implied invitation of
treatment, but this court saw no duty on the hospital's part, and conse-
quently no liability.
2 0 Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal.
App.2d 540, 54 P.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Olander v. Johnson, 258 I1. App. 89
(1930); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924);
McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
21 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
92 d. at 399, 157 So. at 225.
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A court in New York faced a similar problem in 1960.23 In this case,
John J. O'Neill awakened about 5:00 A.M. because of severe chest pains.
He and his wife decided to go to the hospital which was three blocks
away for treatment. Unable to get a cab, the couple walked to the hospi-
tal whereupon O'Neill presented himself at the emergency room. The
nurse on duty refused to admit him because he was a member of a hospi-
tal insurance plan, and the hospital did not take such cases. The nurse did,
however, voluntarily call a hospital insurance plan doctor, and O'Neill
related his symptoms to him by telephone. The doctor agreed to see Mr.
O'Neill in a few hours when the insurance plan's clinic would be open.
Mrs. O'Neill requested an examination of her husband because of the
emergency situation, but such examination was refused. A few minutes
after the O'Neills returned home, he suffered a fatal heart attack. In a
wrongful death action by Mrs. O'Neill against the doctor and the hospi-
tal, the trial court held for defendants. On appeal, the Appellate Division
unanimously reversed as to the doctor, and a majority of three judges re-
versed as to the defendant hospital, holding that:
With respect to the action against the hospital, there is also a question of fact
presented which should have been submitted to the jury. That question is
whether the conduct of the nurse in relation to the deceased was in the nature
of a personal favor to him or whether her conduct was that of an attach6 of
the hospital trying to discharge her duty, and if so, whether what she did was
inadequate. So, too, whether the alleged request of the nurse for an examina-
tion of Mr. O'Neill, following the telephone conversation with Dr. Craig, and
the nurse's refusal to have Mr. O'Neill examined at the hospital constituted
negligent conduct, would also be a question for the jury.24
The two dissenting judges thought the nurse's conduct was by way of
personal favor and could see no basis for liability on the hospital's part.25
But the majority may be said to have seen in the deceased's action an ac-
ceptance of the hospital's implied invitation to treat an emergency case
and a negligent refusal to act in that emergency with death as the result.
Again the plaintiff acts on the promise, but in this case, twenty-six years
after the Crews case, a divided court sees a valid theory of liability.
Although the O'Neill case has been mildly questioned, 26 the Manlove
case apparently rests on this slim reed of precedent. The question is one
of either imposing a legal duty on the hospital or showing its breach of an
23 O'Neill v. Monteflore Hosp., 11 App. Div.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
24 Id. at -- , 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
25 Id. at -- , 202 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (dissenting opinion). McNally, J., with whom
Stevens, J., concurred, said: "It is my view that the conduct of the nurse was by way
of favor and I fail to see any legal basis for liability on the part of the hospital."
26 Thornton & McNiece, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rrv.
1535 (1960).
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existing duty, and the court addressed itself to these questions with little
enthusiasm. Although the defendant stressed the rule of the hospital un-
der which it refused medical treatment to one already under a doctor's
care, the court did not consider it controlling and stated:
Its significance here appears to lie in the fact that it impliedly recognizes that
in case of "frank"-i.e. unmistakable-emergency there is some duty on the
part of the hospital to give help. . . . [The] maintenance of such [an emer-
gency] ward to render first-aid to injured persons has become a well-estab-
lished adjunct to the main business of a hospital. If a person, seriously hurt,
applies for such aid at an emergency ward, relying on the established custom
to render it, is it still the right of the hospital to turn him away without any
reason? In such a case, it seems to us, such a refusal might well result in
worsening the condition of the injured person, because of the time lost in a
useless attempt to obtain medical aid.
Such a set of circumstances is analogous to the case of the negligent termi-
nation of gratuitous services, which creates a tort liability. RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, Negligence § 323. 2 7
The court was not unmindful of the difficulties in the rule's practical
application. Since the services of the interns are in great demand through-
out the hospital, the duty falls on the nurse on duty to make the initial
decision of whether an emergency does or does not exist. In each case the
question then becomes "was her determination ... within the reasonable
limits of judgment of a graduate nurse, even though mistaken, or was she
derelict in her duty ... in not recognizing an emergency from the symp-
toms related to her?" '28 It is submitted that any prudent, not to say hu-
mane, nurse would summon the interne, thereby fully satisfying her duty
in cases of even slightest doubt.
Summarily, the court clarifies the O'Neill case and solidifies its sugges-
tions. The defendant makes an implied promise to treat emergencies by
setting up its emergency room; the plaintiff relying on that invitation re-
sponds to it and seeks aid. The hospital does precisely nothing, but the
court imposes on it a liability for its very failure to act.
No Illinois case treating this subject has been discovered. However, a
private hospital's liability for damages growing out of negligence is the
same as the liability of natural persons in Illinois, 29 and today, if a plain-
tiff brings an action against a charitable institution, he could recover a
judgment, and the immunity of the defendant would extend only to the
protection of its trust property from executionao Perhaps the view of 11-
linois courts when faced with the problem of liability for a failure to
admit might be prophesied by this statement:
27 Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 51 Del. -- , -, 174 A.2d 135, 139 (1961).
2s8d. at -- , 174 A.2d at 141. 290 lander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930).
30 Moore v. Moyle, 405 I11. 555,92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
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In a sense every man, regardless of financial standing, when suddenly taken
sick or injured is a public charge, at least for the time being. It is a common
instinct and duty to render immediate assistance in such cases, and it is no less
a collective obligation extending to organized society than it is an individual
duty. If there is any difference in the measure of the duty of the public and
that of individuals, the obligation resting upon society is stronger than that of
the individual. The duty of an individual to relieve distress is of a moral nature
only. That imposed upon society is more nearly a legal obligation by reason
of the fact that the purpose to promote the interests and advance the general
welfare of the people is expressly declared in constitutions and legislative en-
actments. If not within the strict letter of the law, the acceptance and treat-
ment of emergency cases is clearly within its spirit.31
Some writers3 2 suggest that the bedrock of the hospital's liability in the
O'Neill case is the doctrine that one who undertakes a task must perform
it with ordinary care, and in the Manlove decision, Chief Justice Souther-
land equates defendant's action with the negligent termination of gratui-
tous services which creates a tort liability.3 If the rule is stated obliquely
in O'Neill, it is certainly plain enough in the Manlove case. The court
avoids the tangle of distinguishing misfeasance and nonfeasance which
other courts have deemed the controlling consideration in such cases.
Once the emergency room is provided, if the applicant, knowing of its
existence, applies for treatment in an emergency, arbitrary refusal of serv-
ice resulting in the applicant's damage creates a liability. If an applicant
accepts the implied invitation of an emergency room at a private hospital,
and admission or treatment is denied him to his detriment, liability springs
from the denial.
It is suggested that the Manlove case represents an extension of a long
existing principle of tort law into a new field. Objections may possibly
be raised that its rule imposes an impossible burden on private hospitals.
It is submitted that it does not for at least three reasons. First, they can
close their emergency rooms if they so choose. Second, by the opera-
tion of an emergency room they expressly invite the public to use the
first-aid facility and impliedly suggest that the public not go elsewhere
3 l Jentink v. County of Lake, 244 I11. App. 370, 376-77 (1927).
32 Thornton & McNiece, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1535 (1960).
33 Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 51 Del. -- , 174 A.2d 135 (1961), citing RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS, Negligence § 323 (1934): "(1) One who gratuitously renders serv-
ices to another, otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused to the other by his failure, while so doing, to exercise
with reasonable care such competence and skill as he possesses or leads the other reason-
ably to believe that he possesses. (2) One who gratuitously renders services to another,
otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is not subject to liability for
discontinuing the services if he does not thereby leave the other in a worse position
than he was in when the services were begun."
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for treatment, and a wrongful denial of its service could well be a sub-
stantial injury to an injured or sick person. Third, existence and knowl-
edge of the emergency room is the basis on which the community relies
on its facilities in time of emergency and for the arbitrary denial of its
services which results in injury the private hospital should not escape lia-
bility. The imposition of liability on the private hospital for its refusal to
render treatment or admission in any emergency may well be a manifes-
tation by the courts of "their vitality and consecration to the proposition
that the purpose of law in society is to aid in the solution of the multiple
problems of that society.13 4
34 Dooley, Ten Years of Developments in the Law of Negligent Torts, 10 DE PAUL
L. REv. 503, 537 (1961).
TORTS-EXTENSION OF PRENATAL INJURY DOC-
TRINE TO NONVIABLE INFANTS
Action was brought on behalf of a child born with subnormal mental
faculties who was also hampered by substandard development requiring
special medical attention. It was alleged that the defendant's negligent
operation of her automobile resulted in an accident involving the mother
of the injured child. It was further alleged that the aforementioned negli-
gence of the defendant resulted in injury to the child who was then in the
mother's womb. At the time of the incident, the child's mother was ap-
proximately one month pregnant. The trial court dismissed the action on
the basis that the child was not a viable' foetus, capable of extra-uterine
survival, at the time of the accident and therefore the infant had no iden-
tity apart from the mother. In reversing the trial court's decision, the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois held that an infant, who was born alive and sur-
vives, can maintain an action to recover for prenatal injuries, medically
provable as resulting from the negligence of another, even if it had not
reached the state of a viable foetus at the time of the injury. Daley v.
Meier, 33 111. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
In allowing a cause of action for injuries sustained while a nonviable
infant, Illinois becomes one of a handful of jurisdictions which have re-
cently extended the area of recovery for prenatal injuries to any injury,
occurring prior to birth, which can be proved as resulting from the negli-
gence of another. Relief for prenatal injuries had previously been re-
1 "Viable. Not born dead. Capable of living, said of a fetus that can live outside of
the uterus." MALoY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 567 (2d ed. 1951). "Viable.
Livable, having the appearance of being able to live." BLACK, LAW DICnONARY 1737
(4th ed. 1951).
